East Timor riots expose a political
divide By Loro Horta
It
was a hauntingly familiar scene. Large-scale riots
broke out in East Timor late last month, attended
by looting, arson and the murder of five
civilians. But rather than a rebellion against
foreign occupation, the recent melee in the
capital, Dili, was purely a domestic affair.
A group of nearly 500 soldiers,
disgruntled about their dismissal from the
national service for cost-cutting purposes,
instigated the violence. The United Nations
estimated that 75% of the capital's population
fled the violence and sought refuge in surrounding
mountains. Foreign governments were ready with
plans to rescue their nationals, including
neighboring Australia, which put its navy
on
alert for a possible commando-led evacuation
mission.
Ethnic, religious and historical
rivalries still boil beneath the surface in East
Timor, which had experienced a relative calm since
achieving independence and weathering the
Indonesia-backed militia attacks in 1999 that
resulted in the deaths of 1,400 Timorese and the
destruction of 70% of the country's economic
infrastructure. An estimated 100,000-250,000
individuals were killed under Indonesia's two and
a half decades of violent pacification.
The heady days of East Timor's
independence, officially recognized in 2002, have
since yielded to internal rivalry and mistrust.
That only 500 disgruntled soldiers could spark a
national crisis demonstrates just how weak East
Timor's Fretilin-led government still is, despite
its overwhelming 57% control of parliament and
nearly six years of UN-sponsored capacity-building
support.
More significant, perhaps, the
riots also demonstrate how willing competing
interest groups are to resort to violence to push
forward their agendas. While the protests never
involved more than 2,000 people, they clearly
demonstrated just how vulnerable the current
government is to even small challenges to its
authority. The country's riot police consist of a
mere 50 men, none of whom possess even basic
equipment; many of the country's 3,500 police
officers do not have their own firearms - pistols
are transferred from man to man during duty
shifts.
Regional rivalries are an even
bigger problem. The 500 soldiers who ignited the
recent protests were predominantly from the
western part of the country, and they had
regularly complained about discriminatory
practices in the allegedly eastern-dominated
national army. When the riots broke out in Dili,
many police officers from western areas refused to
tackle the protesters, allowing what should have
been an easy situation for a united force to
control to disintegrate into a tragic circus.
Opposition desperation There
are clear indications that opposition parties
hijacked the protests to discredit and destabilize
the government. One day before the riots, the
government and the leader of the disgruntled
soldiers had announced that an amicable solution
to their complaints was imminent. In a sudden
about-turn, the next day the soldiers demanded
parliament's dissolution - eerily similar to the
demands recently made by the fragmented political
opposition. (Soldiers actually read previous
opposition statements word-for-word calling for
the government's resignation.)
East
Timor's weak political opposition is
understandably desperate. In last year's regional
elections, which were certified as free and fair
by the UN, opposition parties won just one region
out of the total 31 they contested. And there is
no compelling reason to believe that their
prospects for the country's first ever
parliamentary elections, to be held by mid-2007,
will be any different.
The dominance by
Fretilin (Frente Revolucionaria do Timor Leste
Independente, or Revolutionary Front of
Independent East Timor), with a 55-seat majority
in the 88-seat parliament, has recently stirred
political resentments. Fretilin Prime Minister
Mari Alkatiri, an Arab Muslim, has taken on
various powerful interest groups in Timorese
society, chief among them the historically
influential Catholic Church.
Alkatiri's
decision last year to make religious education in
schools optional rather than compulsory put the
church and his government on a collision course.
When asked to comment on the street protests
staged last year by the church against the policy,
Alkatiri famously replied, "Well, I'm not worried
since I know I'm going to hell. Who cares?"
The Roman Catholic Church, which counts
90% of the population among its adherents, has
said it will campaign directly against Alkatiri if
he is nominated as Fretilin's prime-ministerial
candidate during next year's elections.
Alkatiri, who spent 24 years in exile in
Africa after the Indonesian invasion and
occupation of East Timor in 1975, is widely viewed
as a patriot. As prime minister, he has been
praised for brokering a perceived fair deal with
Australia over rights to contested oilfields in
the Timor Sea. His refusal to accept loans from
the World Bank, despite a gross domestic product
per capita of a mere US$400, stems from his
personal experience in Africa, where many poor
countries have become disastrously dependent on
foreign aid.
Rival leaders At
the same time, Alkatiri's controversial leadership
style has brought him into direct conflict with
President and former rebel leader Xanana Gusmao,
widely viewed as the father of East Timor's
independence. The Alkatiri- Gusmao rivalry dates
back to the country's first formative months after
independence, when the two squabbled over drafting
of a constitution.
At the time, Gusmao and
other influential leaders, such as Nobel Peace
Prize winner and current Foreign Minister Jose
Ramos Horta, fought for the adoption of a
presidential system. Alkatiri objected and
leveraged Fretilin's superior numbers into the
establishment of a parliamentary form of
government. While largely a figurehead, Gusmao
retains the power to veto legislation, dissolve
parliament and call for national elections.
Gusmao has since openly supported the two
main opposition parties, the Democrat Party and
the Social Democrat Party, which hold seven and
six seats in parliament respectively, against
Fretilin. The political rivalry, somewhat
dangerously, has seeped down into many government
institutions, with the army and police both
sharply divided between pro-Alkatari and
pro-Gusmao factions.
Factionalism, coupled
with the more ethnically driven east-west regional
rivalries, has made effective police response and
coordination with the army almost impossible, as
demonstrated by the inability to contain the
recent riots.
Some analysts say that the
Alkatiri-Gusmao rivalry, at least partially,
explains the president's rather passive conduct
during the recent riots. If Gusmao had chosen to
intervene decisively, government insiders say,
it's unlikely that the crisis would have spun out
of control. Instead, the president stayed
cloistered in his official residence, doing and
saying nothing - to teach Alkatiri a lesson, some
insiders contend. That some foreign diplomats took
sides during the crisis also added fuel to the
fire.
Another source of instability has
been the numerous martial-arts groups. During
Indonesia's occupation, many young Timorese joined
martial-arts groups as a way to defend themselves.
Since independence, some of these groups have
turned to crime, running extortion, protection,
gambling and smuggling rackets. The largest of
these groups, the Gorkas, is estimated to have
some 10,000 members. Others are affiliated with
certain powerful individuals who have well-known
political ambitions.
For instance, the
Sagrada Familia group has close links with a
former guerrilla commander, Furai Bot, who has
opposed the government since 2001. Others, such as
Calimao 2000, are increasingly acting as
professional thugs-for-hire. Endemic unemployment,
which exceeds 50% nationwide and is as high as 70%
in Dili, means recruiting is easy for such groups.
East Timor has by no means reached the
political tipping point toward renewed civil
conflict. But the post-independence honeymoon is
clearly over, and old rivalries are palpably
intensifying. A weak state, an opportunistic
opposition, intense leadership rivalries, and the
rising power of organized gangs all came together
to create the explosive mix that led to the Dili
riots. Nearly 25 years of foreign occupation
left behind many scars, including a deep-seated
culture of violence and mistrust. As the state
moves to assert its authority over East Timor's
fiercely independent people, it's essential that
the government, opposition and security forces all
speak with one cohesive voice. The early days of
nationhood, as East Timor is now clear
demonstrating, are never easy.
Loro
Horta is a master's degree candidate at
Nanyang Technological University's Institute of
Defense and Strategic Studies in Singapore. He
previously served as an adviser to the East
Timorese Defense Department. The views expressed
here are strictly his own.
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2006 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved.
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